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The Highly Blameworthy Manufacturer:
Implications on Rules of Liability and Defense in
Products Liability Actions
DAVID G. OWEN*
I.

INTRODUCTION

"[Tihe law does, in general, determine liability by blameworthiness .

. . ."'

When Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote these words in

The Common Law in 1881, the fault basis of accident law was at its
height. Yet the rules of accident law in the late nineteenth century
had only recently emerged from a tradition that was centuries old
and fundamentally strict. Nor would many years pass before the
foundations of accident law would begin to shift away from fault
back in the direction of strict liability.! Playing a major role in this
latter development was the law of products liability.' Today, products liability law is principally based on strict liability.4
In viewing this development one might well be tempted to conclude that accident law should no longer concern itself with "fault"
or "blame" - that its experiment with such concepts should be viewed only as a digressive flirtation with Victorian moralistic notions
that have no place in an enlightened system of law. But there is a
different view of the evolution of the law of torts: that, even prior to
the development of the negligence action, liability had important
roots in the concept of fault.' Holmes himself subscribed to this in*Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. Visiting Associate
Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. B.S., 1967; J.D., 1971, University of Pennsylvania.
The author is grateful for comments made on an earlier draft of this article by
his colleague, Robert L. Felix of the University of South Carolina, his visiting colleague, C. John Miller of the University of Leeds, England, and Aaron D. Twerski of
Hofstra University.
'o.HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 108 (1881) [hereinafter cited as 0. HOLMES].
'These developments have been traced elsewhere. See, e.g., Gregory, Trespass
to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359 (1.951); James, Analysis of the
Origin and Development of the Negligence Actions, in U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION,
THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION (1970); Malone, Ruminations
on the Role of Fault in the History of the Common Law of Torts, 31 LA. L. REV. 1
(1970).

'The first such cases were brought in warranty and involved the sale of defective
food. See, e.g., Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913).
'Liability for selling defective products is "strict" under U.C.C. §§
2-315 (1972 version), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 402A, 402B
"'[D]espite the initial dominance of the idea of strict liability, there
almost from the beginning an intuitive concern by courts for the

blameworthiness or lack of it." Malone, supra note 2, at 44.

2-313, 2-314,
(1965).
was evident
defendant's
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terpretation of tort law history.' And while fault has indeed experienced a rather spectacular eclipse in accident law in recent
years, especially in the products liability area, there is no reason to
conclude that blameworthiness has become irrelevant to the resolu-'
tion of tort cases generally,' or products liability cases in particular
Elsewhere I have examined the role of fault in determining
damages for aggravated misconduct, particularly in the products
liability context.' The purpose of the present article is to explore
the effect of aggravated fault on the central rules of liability" and
defense11 in products liability litigation.
It is axiomatic in tort law that a person will not be held responsible for all harm attributable to his actions. Rules of duty, causation, defense, and damages all operate in balance to restrict the
scope of a defendant's legal responsibility for his damaging conduct.
The total structure of such rules operates to accommodate various
interests of the injurer, the injured, and society at large. 2 But lending support to this balanced structure of rules is the premise, true
in perhaps most accident cases, that the defendant's damaging conduct was only inadvertent. As strict liability for product and other
accidents has developed in recent years, imbalances in the classic
negligence structure of the rules have been perceived, and adjustments have been made." An imbalance in the structure of liability rules and defenses is also created when the defendant's actions,
'See 0. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 88-107.
7
See Kelly, The Inner Nature of the Tort Action, 2 IR. JUR. 279 (N.S. 1967);
Veitch & Miers, Assault on the Law of Tort, 38 MOD. L. REV. 139 (1975).
'While the negligence theory of liability is of course predicated on a form of
blameworthiness, this article will discuss the effects of aggravated fault on other rules
of liability and defense in products liability cases.
'Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV.
1258 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Owen, Punitive Damages].
"The central issues of liability that will be discussed are defectiveness, cause in
fact, and proximate causation.
"The defenses to be discussed are contributory negligence, comparative
negligence, assumption of risk, and product misuse.
"See 0. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 144.
"Thus, for actions brought in strict tort, most states have eliminated the contributory negligence defense and have narrowed the defense of assumption of risk. See
text accompanying notes 90-96 and 104-16 infra. In many states the defense of contributory negligence has been abolished and proximate cause limitations liberalized in
the plaintiff's favor in actions against possessors of animals, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 515(1), 510 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964), and for abnormally dangerous activities, id. at §§ 524(1), 522. And of course major changes have been wrought by the
workmen's compensation laws in the nature of the employee's rights concerning jobrelated accidents. See, e.g., Mitchell, Products Liability, Workmen's Compensation and
the Industrial Accident, 14 DuQ. L. REV. 349 (1976).
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lying at the other end of the culpability scale, fairly can be
characterized as "flagrant," "willful and wanton," or "reckless."
Here too certain limited reaccommodations have been made in the
general tort law rules outside the products liability area to correct
the resulting imbalances in the classic structure.'
The thesis of this article is that the imbalance in the rules
created when a manufacturer acts recklessly, in flagrant disregard
of consumer safety, should be rectified in order to maintain a fair accommodation of interests between the manufacturer and consumers.
It is proposed that the scope of a manufacturer's legal responsibility
for injuries from its defective products should reflect the measure of
its culpability for marketing such products; that is, as blameworthiness increases, so should liability. This can be accomplished by
broadening certain rules of liability and by narrowing certain rules
of defense. It will be seen that the two general tort law rules to
such effect-one pertaining to proximate cause" and the other pertaining to contributory negligence"- are logically applicable to the
products liability context. Possible changes in certain other products
liability rules will also be considered for use in the context of highly
blameworthy marketing misconduct.
There is apparently no case law examining what effect a
manufacturer's aggravated misconduct should have on the normal
rules of liability and defense." This is probably attributable to at
least two factors. First, manufacturers generally do act responsibly
in manufacturing and marketing their products and only infrequently act in a manner that is highly blameworthy or "reckless." Second,
a body of products liability principles has begun to mature only in
the past ten or fifteen years. 8 Over this time, most of the attention

"See notes 15 and 16 infra and accompanying text.
"See notes 76-89 infra and accompanying text.
"See notes 90-96 infra and accompanying text.
17Research
has uncovered only one reported products liability decision which even
raises the issue, and the reference is in a footnote to the dissenting opinion. See
Ussery v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] PROD. LIAB. REP.
(CCH) 1 7084, at 12,479 n.4 (4th Cir. 1973) (Winter, C.J., dissenting) (opinion withdrawn
by order filed March 31, 1975).
"The seminal cases that spearheaded the modern development of products liability law were decided in 1960 and 1963. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d
897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). The predominant treatise on products liability, L. FRUMER
& M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1976), was first published in 1960, and the first
edition of the other treatise in the field, R. HURSH (now with H. BAILEY), AMERICAN
LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY (2d ed. 1974), was published one year later. The first
Canadian text, S. WADDAMS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, was published in 1974, and the first
English text has just been published. C.J. MILLER & P. LOVELL, PRODUCT LIABILITY
(Butterworths 1977).
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of the courts and commentators has been focused in the other direction- on the central issues of the nature and reach of strict liability
in tort and its defenses. Little thought has been devoted to the more
peripheral and infrequent problems such as the one under discussion. Yet such problems must be addressed as the discipline
develops, and hypotheticals can be used in lieu of decided cases as
the basis for discussion.
II.

"HIGHLY BLAMEWORTHY" CONDUCT IN THE
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CONTEXT

The thought of a manufacturer's acting in a manner that is
"blameworthy" or, especially, "highly blameworthy" is foreign to the
traditional thinking of many persons in a free enterprise system
such as ours. Certainly the affairs of manufacturing enterprises
rarely, if ever, are conducted with the type of ill will or malice that
characterizes the most culpable forms of human misbehavior. Indeed, manufacturing enterprises usually exist to generate a profit
by making and selling goods-a singularly neutral, indeed beneficial,
purpose and form of activity. Why and how, one may ask, would
such enterprises ever act in a manner properly classifiable as
"willful and wanton"?
The "why" part of the question in many cases is answered easily: to increase profits. In most other cases the explanation probably
lies in the manufacturer's simple indifference to the safety attributes of its products.19 The "how" part may be demonstrated by
examining some cases.
Perhaps the classic case of manufacturer misbehavior was
Richardson-Merrell's marketing in the early 1960's of MER/29, a
drug supposed to reduce the level of blood cholesterol' and hence to
reduce the incidence of heart attacks and strokes. From the start,
the company's animal tests of the drug clearly indicated its potential
danger, particularly to the subject's eyes. Yet in order to expedite
the marketing of a drug that promised to be especially profitable,
the company perpetrated a major fraud on the public. First, it submitted false test data to the Food and Drug Administration to obtain approval to sell the drug; then, to improve the drug's
marketability, it lied about the drug's contraindications to its
salesmen and the medical community."'
"For an explanation of how the sale of defective products can be profitable, see
Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 9, at 1292-95. See id. at 1361-71 for an examination of the notion of flagrant indifference to consumer safety.
'0There was some doubt that it did. See Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal.
App. 2d 689, 694, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 403 (1967).
"For a full description of Richardson-Merrell's conduct in the development and
marketing of MER/29, see Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir.
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A more recent example involves the marketing by the A.H.
Robins Company of the Dalkon Shield, an intrauterine contraceptive
device. Similar to the MER/29 situation, this manufacturer also hurried its product to the market in an attempt to reap substantial profits.22 Misleading advertising"3 helped to stimulate a successful sales
campaign."' But before long, the company found itself faced with a
congressional investigation25 and hundreds of lawsuits. The reason
for both was that users of the IUD incurred substantial risks of injury, sometimes fatal, which the manufacturer had failed to discover
because its patently inadequate testing generated favorable but
very inaccurate results."
A final example of a manufacturer's acting in reckless disregard
of consumer safety involves the design and marketing of an "uncrashworthy" automobile by General Motors. The plaintiffs decedent was killed when struck in the neck by the hood of his car which
penetrated the windshield following a head-on collision. Despite its
knowledge of over a hundred instances of windshield hood penetration from the same design that had resulted in disfigurement,
1967); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967);
Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation,
56 CALIF. L. REV. 116 (1968). The juries in both Roginsky and Toole rendered compensatory and punitive damages verdicts against the defendant, although the punitive
damages verdict in the former case was reversed on appeal in a split opinion.
"The mark-up by manufacturers generally in the sale of IUDs to physicians is
reported to have averaged nearly 1000 percent. See Regulation of Medical Devices (Intrauterine Contraceptive Devices): HearingsBefore the Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1973) (testimony of Russell J.
Thomsen, M.D.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
'The company is reported to have engaged in a deceptive promotional campaign
based upon the results of patently deficient tests. "[Tihe Dalkon Shield and its promotion provide the classic example of the misuse of statistics to market an item." Id at
61. See id at 61, 62, 74-76, 83-94. See generally M. DIXON, DRUG PRODUCT LIABILITY §
11.43 (1975); Note, The Intrauterine Device: A Criticism of Governmental Complaisance and an Analysis of Manufacturer and Physician Liability, 24 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 247 (1975); Comment, Up Against the (Uterine) Wal. An Analysis of the Liability
of Birth Control Products Manufacturers, 2 S. ILL. U.L. REV. 498 (1976).
"By June 28, 1974, when A. H. Robins suspended distribution of the Dalkon
Shield, the product had been inserted into approximately 2.2 million women in the
United States. In re A. H. Robins Co., "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liability Litigation, 406 F. Supp. 540 (J. P. M. D. L. 1975).
'See Hearings, supra note 22.
"It was reported over a year ago that more than five hundred actions had been
filed against A. H. Robins Company for injuries caused by the Dalkon Shield. Wall St.
J., Feb. 19, 1976, at 6, col. 2 (midwest ed.).
"7See Hearings, supra note 22, at 61, 62, 74-76, 83-94. For a full account of the intrauterine contraceptive device problem in general and A. H. Robins' activities concerning the development and marketing of the Dalkon Shield in particular, see authorities
cited in note 23 supra.
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paralysis, and even decapitation, General Motors reportedly had not
altered the design nor even warned of the danger.28
In each of these cases, the manufacturer's behavior was highly
blameworthy." Each of the three cases, however, represents a different form of misbehavior. 0 The MER/29 case exemplifies active
deception of the public concerning a product's dangers. The Dalkon
Shield case illustrates a reckless failure to discover a product's
dangers. The uncrashworthy car case shows a reckless failure to
remedy a dangerous condition known to be defective.
Yet despite the differences in these forms of misbehavior, each
one deserves classification as "reckless," "oppressive," "willful and
wanton," or "in conscious disregard of consumer safety." Probably
the most descriptive phrase encompassing all three forms of
marketing misconduct is "flagrant indifference to the public safety."
This is the standard I have advanced for manufacturer punitive
damages liability,8 and it appears to be equally well suited to a
reformulation of the rules of liability and defense in cases of
flagrant marketing misbehavior. The principal characteristic of the
conduct described in the standard is the manufacturer's gross abuse
of its position of control over product danger information. It is
behavior far more culpable than negligence," reflecting a callous
sacrifice of consumer interests for the benefit of the enterprise.u
This is the nature of aggravated blameworthiness in the products
liability context.
"These facts laid the foundation for an unreported case against General Motors
seeking compensatory and punitive damages that was settled before trial. Wallace v.
General Motors Corp., No. WPB-75-65-Civ-CF (S.D. Fla. 1975). See Owen, Punitive
Damages, supra note 9, at 1328 n.334.
"For other case examples of highly blameworthy manufacturer behavior, see
Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 9, at 1325-61.
"The following textual discussion of aggravated manufacturer misbehavior draws
substantially upon Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 9, at 1361-71.
"1Id. at 1367.
"I am basically advocating a system in which the culpability of the defendant
does not become relevant until it so substantially exceeds negligence as to reflect a different kind of misbehavior as well as degree-one that can fairly be called "flagrant,"
"oppressive," or "reckless." However, culpability in any degree should probably affect
the apportionment of damages reduced on account of the misconduct of the plaintiff.
See notes 97-103, 116, and 126 infra and accompanying text.
"The standard for determining reckless misconduct is often properly held to be
objective. See, e.g., Williamson v. McKenna, 223 Or. 366, 395-400, 354 P.2d 56, 69-71
(1960); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.15, at 953-55 (1956). See
generally Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 9, at 1362-69. Not all courts agree. See
2 HARPER & JAMES, supra, § 16.15, at 49-51 (Supp. 1968). Although the standard of
misconduct should probably be objective, evidence of the defendant's state of
mind- consciousness of defectiveness in the products liability context-should nevertheless be admissible. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra, § 16.15 at 956-57; Owen, Punitive
Damages, supra note 9, at 1369-70.
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III.

DEFECTIVENESS

The central issue of liability in many products liability cases is
the defectiveness vel non of the product. For purposes of the present discussion the question is whether the aggravated blameworthiness of a manufacturer in marketing a product should affect the
determination of whether it is deemed "defective." Because the conduct of the defendant as well as the defectiveness of the product is
properly in issue in fraud and negligence cases, evidence of culpability is, of course, pertinent and goes to the essence of the cause of action. Yet the "strict" theories of products liability purport to direct
attention away from the conduct of the manufacturer to the safety
of the product within its environment of use.U Whether then a
manufacturer's culpability may ever properly be considered on the
liability issue in such cases will be examined in this section.
As a general principle, the manufacturer's blameworthiness in
marketing a product in a particular condition probably should not be
considered in determining the defectiveness of that condition.u The
two concepts generally are unrelated. Either the product was
manufactured according to specifications, or it was not; its design
was adequately safe, or it was not; its warning adequately informed
consumers of a hidden danger, or it did not. While these questions of
defectiveness are often complex, involving the consideration of many
factors," the manufacturer's culpability in marketing the product in
an injury-producing condition generally should not be one of them.
Defectiveness is normally determined, 7 depending on the court,
either on the basis of the consumer's reasonable expectationsu or on
USee, e.g., Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration
of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REV. 803, 808-09 (1976);
Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965); Weinstein, Twerski,
Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 DuQ.
L. REV. 425, 429 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Weinstein et aL]. The fact that the theory
of recovery pleaded is "strict" should not impede consideration of the effect that a
manufacturer's aggravated blameworthiness should have on the rules of liability and

defense. Cf. Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 9, at 1268-77.
"But cf notes 40-42 infra and accompanying text.
"See, e.g., Montgomery & Owen, supra note 34, at 814-19; Wade, On the Nature
of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L. J. 825, 837-38.
"In manufacturing flaw cases, as a practical matter at least, defectiveness is

usually determined on whether the product in fact contained a flaw. Cf. Montgomery
& Owen, supra note 34, at 818-19 n.51. But even this determination can be difficult.
See Weinstein et aL, supra note 34, at 430-33 n.11.
uSee, e.g., Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis.
2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975). See generally RESTATEMENT

Comments g, i (1965).

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A,
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a risk-benefit or cost-benefit analysis." Blame does not appear to be
relevant to the issue.
The issue, however, is not always quite so clear. For one thing,
those courts that use a risk-benefit method for determining defectiveness are relying at least in part upon the traditional negligence
standard of liability which is rooted in the notion of blameworthiness."0 If a court uses a cost-benefit approach, however, the
manufacturer's actual blame in marketing the product in its offending condition will not be in issue at all since full knowledge of the
harmful effects of the condition will be imputed to the manufacturer
in any event under the theory of liability." Nevertheless, some
juries and perhaps even some courts will probably mistakenly consider blame to be relevant to the cost-benefit defectiveness determination. This is because the fact finder in some jurisdictions is asked to decide if the manufacturer would have been negligent in
marketing the product in a particular condition if it had known of
the injuries that would be caused as a result. 2
Blame may creep into the defectiveness determination in
another way. In difficult cases, defectiveness as a duty issue can
become entangled in the other basic duty issue of proximate
cause-both of which serve as vehicles for defining the scope of
liability. As will be discussed below,' 8 the normal rules of proximate
cause may properly be stretched in cases of aggravated marketing
misconduct. Thus, sometimes indirectly, blame may become relevant
to the outcome of the duty issue whether it is framed in terms of
defectiveness or of proximate cause. Moreover, as a practical matter
in a case in which the adequacy of the design or warning is a close
question, the jury will usually be tempted-and perhaps not inappropriately so-to tip the balance against a highly blameworthy
manufacturer.
For example, suppose that as in McCormack v. Hankscraft Co."
a small child accidentally knocks over a vaporizer and is severely
burned by the boiling water that gushes out. Even if it is shown
"See, e.g., Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Helicoid Gage
Div. of Amer. Chain & Cable Co. v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
"See generally Owen & Montgomery, supra note 34, at 824-29. Nor is this conclusion altered by the fact that the court may consider some additional factors, such as
the manufacturer's ability to insure or spread the loss, not pertinent to a negligence
determination. Cf. id. at 818; Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Pro-

ducts, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973).
"See Montgomery & Owen, supra note 34, at 843-45.
"Id.; Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974).
"See text accompanying notes 76-89 infra.
"278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967). In the Hankscraft vaporizer the water apparently looked still and did not appear to be boiling. Id. at 331, 154 N.W.2d at 496.
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that the injury would have been prevented had the vaporizer top
been threaded to screw onto the water container, or that it might
have been averted if a warning had been given that the water was
scalding hot, the defendant manufacturer might nevertheless interpose the defense that the danger was open and obvious.'
Although this rule is breaking down,'" some courts still hold as a
matter of law that a product is not defective if the danger is obvious.'7 Assuming that the danger was obvious, ie., that boiling
water was visible inside the glass container, a court following the
obvious danger rule-or one applying a consumer expectations test
of defectiveness-would be hard-pressed not to dismiss the case. "
Suppose further, however, that while the manufacturer knew of a
dozen other cases of severe burns caused by its vaporizers tipping
over on small children in a similar manner, 9 it had nevertheless failed either to eliminate the hazard by threading the top or even to
reduce it by giving a warning.
On such facts, the defectiveness determination by a court or jury
might well be influenced by the blameworthiness of the manufacturer's inaction in the face of a known and serious danger50 Thus,
despite the usual irrelevance of blameworthiness to the question of
defectiveness, evidence of a manufacturer's gross irresponsibility
may in some cases influence the determination of that issue.
IV.

CAUSATION

In any discussion of the role of causation in tort law, it is helpful
to isolate the issue of cause in fact from that of proximate causation." While the two concepts frequently overlap and are often
"See id. at 337, 154 N.W.2d at 496.
"See, e.g., Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115
(1976), abrogating the obvious danger-no duty rule of Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468,
95 N.E.2d 802 (1950). See generally Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a
Right. Manufacturers' Liability for Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1065 (1973).
"E.g., Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973).
"In McCormack, the court held that the danger was not so obvious as to bar
recovery. 278 Minn. at 333, 335, 154 N.W.2d at 496, 498. A court applying a consumer
expectations test to determine the vaporizer's defectiveness would probably consider
the expectations of the parents rather than of the child. See Bellotte v. Zayre Corp.,
116 N.H. 52, 352 A.2d 723 (1976). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment i (1965).
'"See 278 Minn. at 330, 154 N.W.2d at 495.
"The manufacturer's culpability will be even greater in such a case if, as in
Hankscraft, it touts the safety of its product when it knows of a serious danger in the
product. See 278 Minn. at 330, 154 N.W.2d at 495.
"See generally Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for
Harry Kalven. Jr., 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 69 (1975).
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treated indiscriminately by the courts, 2 precise analysis requires
that they be examined separately. This is particularly true where
the context of their consideration is the blameworthiness of the
defendant's behavior, since the law has treated them differently in
this area.
A.

Cause in Fact

Considered in the abstract, the determination of whether a plaintiffs injuries are in fact attributable to a product defect is logically
unrelated to the manufacturer's blameworthiness in marketing the
product in that condition. As one court said in a recent products
liability case, "It is inconceivable that anyone should be held civilly
liable for an injury which he did not cause, whether he be charged
with negligence, intentional wrongdoing, or conduct giving rise to
absolute liability."" The metaphysical notion of cause and effect thus
appears to be a closed system concerning only the relationship of an
action to events following thereafter, without regard to the
culpability of the actor in producing the action.
This apparent irrelevance of blameworthiness to cause in fact is
justified when the focus of analysis is on "but for" causation. That
is, the manufacturer's blameworthiness will indeed be irrelevant to
causation if it is shown that the plaintiff's injuries would have occurred
in any event even if the product had not been defective. For example, suppose the driver of an automobile with defective brakes falls
asleep at the wheel and is injured when his car hits a tree. Assuming the manufacturer's blameworthiness involved its failure to adequately test the car's brakes, there would be no "but for" causal
relation between the defect, or the misconduct, and the injury. The
injury would have occurred anyway, even if the brakes had been in
perfect condition. In cases such as this, where the "but for" test of
causation definitely exculpates the manufacturer, it should prevail
regardless of the extent of its culpability in marketing the product
in a defective condition.
"See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 41, 42, at 236, 244 (4th ed.
1971).8
Sabich v. Outboard Marine Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 591, 131 Cal. Rptr. 703, 706
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976). See also Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47
U. COLO. L. REV. 153 (1975):
With but a few recently developed and very limited exceptions .... the rule
has been: no matter how tortious the defendant's conduct may have been and
no matter how long or how strongly a given loss has been considered compensable, unless the plaintiff is able to persuade the fact finder by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's activity was at least one
of the infinite 'but for' causes of his losses, the plaintiff cannot recover.
Id. at 163 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
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At least in products liability cases, however, cause in fact questions are usually of a different type. The more typical factual causation issue in this context is one of proof: is the circumstantial
evidence of how the accident happened adequate to support the inferences that a defect existed in the product and that it was a
substantial factor in producing the misadventure? This is a very different issue from "but for" causation; it is a question of degree of
the certainty of proof, of the likelihood that a product defect was an
appreciable factor in producing the accident. This is in fact the
primary form of proof of causation available in a good number of
products cases, particularly where the plaintiff is killed in the accident, and where the evidence on causation is circumstantial and admits of alternative explanations of how the accident occurred. A
workable rule applied to this type of cause in fact problem in some
torts cases outside of the products liability area is that to prevail,
the plaintiff must only show that the defendant's conduct substantially increased the risk of the type of harm he suffered." This concept of causation is sometimes called a "causal linkage."65
By its terms the causal linkage test is very flexible since the
standard of "substantial increase in risk" is subject to varying interpretations. In cases involving the sale of defective products in
flagrant disregard of the public safety, the test probably should be
altered to whether the defect or the manufacturer's misconduct
substantially increased the risk of the type of injury suffered by the
plaintiff. When the causal linkage issue is close, and the manufacturer's behavior in marketing the defective product flagrantly improper, it is submitted that the determination of "substantial increase in risk" should be made against the manufacturer. This is appropriate because the normal balance of fairness between the plaintiff, normally carrying the burden of proof on causation, and the
defendant, usually innocent or at worst inadvertent, is altered when
the defendant has deliberately or recklessly exposed the plaintiff to
a substantial risk of harm.
So, to change the facts of the previous hypothetical somewhat,
assume that the plaintiffs decedent is found dead behind the wheel
of his automobile that crashed into a tree. Suppose further that the
evidence on the cause of the accident supports inferences of approx"See, e.g., Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745, 478 P.2d 465 (1970);
Reynolds v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 37 La. Ann. 694 (1885). See generally 2 HARPER &
JAMES, supra note 33, § 28.7. at 1548.
'See Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745, 755, 478 P.2d 465, 475 (1970);
Calabresi, supra note 51, at 71-72. "In sum, the concept of causal linkage between acts
and activities and injuries is no more than an expression of empirically based belief
that the act or activity in question will, if repeated in the future, increase the
likelihood that the injury under consideration will also occur." Id at 72.
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imately equal plausibility that the decedent either fell asleep at the
wheel or was awake but unable to avert the accident because of
defective brakes. If the manufacturer had failed to test the brakes
adequately, and this failure is shown to have been reckless, in
flagrant disregard of the risk to the public, the plaintiff can fairly be
permitted to prevail on the causation issue. This should be true
even though from the traditional perspective he is unable to meet
his burden of proof (by a preponderance of the evidence) on this
point. There are two reasons for this conclusion: (1) the manufacturer's misconduct substantially increased the risk of the type of accident that killed the decedent, and (2) the decedent was subjected
to this risk only because of the manufacturer's grossly irresponsible
behavior. This result effectively shifts the burden of proof on causation to the highly blameworthy manufacturer, an approach that has
been used in certain other tort contexts where the usual burden of
proof rules operate as harsh and insuperable obstacles to recovery
and where they fairly may be altered in the plaintiffs favor."
Thus, questions of causal linkage, rather than directly concerning metaphysical cause and effect, primarily involve questions of
fairness to the parties concerning the degree of proof required to
establish metaphysical causation. "The tendency to temper rules to
fit moral conduct . . . in the field of certainty of proof' has been
recognized on the damages side of tort law for some time.57 Courts
also have tended to administer the rules of causation "in such a
manner as to be most severe upon the intentional wrongdoer and
more severe upon the reckless wrongdoer than upon the negligent
wrongdoer."" Thus, the manufacturer's blameworthiness may properly bear on the resolution of the cause in fact issue in certain products liability cases.
Drayton v. Jiffee Chemical Corp.,5 while not expressly addressing the relation of blameworthiness to factual causation, is illustrative of how it may operate. The infant plaintiff sued the
manufacturer of a drain cleaner called "liquid-plumr" for severe
"See, e.g., Hall v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y.
1972) (burden of proof on identity of manufacturer of destroyed blasting cap that injured plaintiff shifted to multiple defendant manufacturers); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25
Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944) (burden of proof on identity of person responsible for
plaintiffs traumatic injury while anesthetized for surgery shifted to multiple medical
defendants); Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (burden of proof on identity of hunter whose shot injured plaintiff shifted to defendants who simultaneously
shot in plaintiffs direction).
"7See Bauer, The Degree of Moral Fault as Affecting Defendant's Liability, 81 U.
PA. L. REV. 586, 592 (1933).
"Id. at 588 (footnote omitted).
11395 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
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burns suffered when a bottle of drain cleaner tipped over and
doused her with the contents. The bottle was discarded after the accident,' and the manufacturer argued that its product had been
mistaken for a competitor's drain cleaner called "Mister Plumber"
which it claimed was more likely to have been the product that caused
the plaintiff's injuries. Thus, the cause in fact question concerned
the identity of the product.' Apart from the landlady's testimony
that she had purchased a bottle of "liquid-plumr" more than a year
before the accident, and the recollection of the plaintiffs parents, it
appeared far more likely that the injury-producing product had indeed been "Mister Plumber" rather than the defendant's "liquidplumr." Indeed, the father testified that after pouring some of the
drain cleaner into the sink he covered it with a towel, just before
the accident, and that he "dabbed" rather than "flushed" or
"flooded" the child's face thereafter, actions much more consistent
with the instructions on the competitor's label than on the defendant's. "' Moreover, the extreme causticity of the product may have
been more consistent with the chemical composition of the competitor's product." Despite this strong objective evidence of product
misidentity, the court nevertheless accepted the weaker testimonial
identity evidence of the landlady and parents."
The cause in fact issue was central in Drayton," either "liquidplumr" had been the cause of the injuries, or it had not. Circumstantial evidence of causation or identity was all that was available, and
the question could clearly be decided either way. It may be that
what tipped the scales in the plaintiffs favor on this issue was
evidence that the "defendant's conduct in designing and marketing
liquid-plumr was . . .perhaps even reckless ....."" Although the

blameworthiness issue was not fully developed in the reported opinion, this case illustrates the type of close cause in fact situation in
which a manufacturer's culpability may influence the causation
issue.
Another common cause in fact problem in products liability
cases concerns the question of whether the plaintiff relied on the
or misleading
inadequate warnings
allegedly
defendant's
"Id at 1086.
"See note 56 supra noting examples of tort cases in other contexts where the
plaintiff was relieved of his normal obligation to establish the identity of the defendant.
6395 F. Supp. at 1086-87. Nor had the father had any prior experience with other
drain cleaners. Id at 1087.
"Id at 1087.
"Id See also Drayton v. Jiffee Chemical Corp., 413 F. Supp. 834, 835-36 (N.D.
Ohio 1976).
"395 F. Supp. at 1097.
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statements." If the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the manufacturer's misrepresentation caused him to alter his conduct in a manner leading to his injury, or if he cannot establish that he would
have read and acted upon an adequate warning so as to avert injury,
then the plaintiff would not appear to be able to connect his injury
to a breach !of duty by the manufacturer. Such a failure to prevail on
the cause in fact issue would seem to be fatal to the plaintiff's case.
But the plaintiffs failure personally to see or otherwise learn of
the inadequate warning or misrepresentation should not necessarily
be fatal to his case." If he can establish that someone else's actions
were affected by the inadequate or false information in a manner
leading to the plaintiffs injury, he has established a causal connection. 8 For example, a doctor's reliance on drug literature may be imputed to his patient who is injured by the drug. 9
Attributing reliance in this manner from a third person to the
plaintiff should be liberally allowed in cases of flagrant marketing
misbehavior by manufacturers. Thus, in the MER/29 situation
discussed above, 0 the FDA's reliance on the company's manipulated
animal test results should have inured to the benefit of every consumer injured by the defective drug since the FDA was acting on
behalf of all consumers and since the company's misrepresentations
made to that agency substantially increased the risk that the drug
would be approved and that users would develop cataracts. Strangely, in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrel4 Inc., Judge Friendly did not
agree: "If we were forced to decide, we would say that a plaintiff
does not make out a case of fraud simply by showing that if the
facts had been fully stated, the FDA might not have released the
drug."71 If in fact the probability that the FDA would release the
drug without further testing was increased in any material degree
"See generally Phillips, Product Misrepresentationand the Doctrine of Causation, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 561 (1974).
t

Some courts appropriately allow a presumption that the plaintiff would have

read and heeded an adequate warning. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498
F.2d 1264, 1281-82 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Nissen Trampoline

Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat'l Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820, 826-27 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975), rev'd
on procedural grounds, 358 N.E.2d 974 (Ind. 1976). Cf. Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d
1099, 1109 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976).

"See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B, Comment j (1965). See generally 2
& JAMES, aupra note 33, § 28.7, at 1548.
"See, e.g., Wechsler v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 198 Misc. 540, 99 N.Y.S.2d 588
(Sup. Ct. 1950); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 702, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 398, 411 (1967). Cf. Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 1079, 91
Cal. Rptr. 319, 330 (1970).
"See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
1378 F.2d 832, 837 (2d Cir. 1967) (footnote omitted).
HARPER
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on account of the fraud,"2 then Judge Friendly's conclusion was quite
clearly too restrictive. Even had Richardson-Merrell not been highly
blameworthy, the plaintiffs causal link nonetheless would have been
clearly established; the company's flagrant misbehavior should have
eliminated any lingering doubts on this issue.
Since the Food and Drug Administration acts on behalf of the
public, its reliance, like a doctor's, is plainly imputable to injured
members of the public. But a nonrelying plaintiff may be able to
establish a causal link, albeit a weaker one, even in cases where the
third parties who did rely on the inadequate or false information
were not acting on his behalf. For example, suppose a manufacturer
markets a product with fraudulent claims of its safety or with grossly inadequate warnings in view of a known and serious hidden
danger. Even if the injured plaintiff never learns of the fraudulent
claims nor reads the label or product literature containing the warning, someone else may and thereby causally link the misconduct or
the defect to the plaintiffs injury. One may assume that manufacturers culpably market products in this manner in order to improve
the marketability of the product at a particular price."8 If consumers
were to know of the actual danger hidden in the product and
wrongfully concealed from them by the manufacturer, many might
be unwilling to purchase it at the same price or even at all."
Economic constraints might well then force the manufacturer either
to cure the defect or, if that were not possible, perhaps to take it off
the market altogether. In this way, a manufacturer's communication
of false or inadequate information to consumers in general can be
seen to increase the risk of harm to all consumers of the product, including those who individually neither knew of the misrepresentation nor read the inadequate warning. Even these consumers then,
can establish a causal link between the manufacturer's informational
malfeasance and injuries generated by the danger that was intentionally or recklessly concealed. The reliance of some, it might be
said, fairly may be imputed to all."
Since this type of causal link argument regarding safety information failures is concededly somewhat novel, some courts may reject
it in cases of innocent or merely inadvertent conduct. Yet when the
manufacturer deceitfully or recklessly misleads the public concern7
This appears to have been the case. See Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251
Cal. App. 2d 689, 696, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 405 (1967).
7
See Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 9, at 1294-95.
"See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 505-06 (8th Cir. 1968); Spruill
v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 87 (4th Cir. 1962) ("had the warning been in a form

calculated ...

to convey a conception of the true nature of the danger, this mother ...

might not have purchased the product at all").
"See Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 9, at 1348-49 n.443.
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ing the safety of a product, the imputation of reliance from consumers generally to those injured by the concealed danger appears
eminently sound in both logic and justice. This should be equally
true whether the misconduct involved supplying false assurances of
product safety or failing to supply adequate warnings of danger.
Thus, the cause in fact issue may appropriately be affected by the
aggravated blameworthiness of the manufacturer in some types of
products liability cases.
B. Proximate Cause
Proximate causation usually involves questions quite different
from factual causation, although the two sometimes overlap. The
establishment of some type of cause in fact linkage is in most cases
an analytical prerequisite to an intelligent consideration of the proximate or legal cause issue." Thus, the proximate cause issue generally assumes that the plaintiffs injury was in fact caused by the
defendant's conduct or product defect, and involves the further
question of whether the defendant for some other reason of policy
or fairness should nonetheless be shielded from responsibility for
the harm." Perhaps the most unifying rationale for the variety of
applications of the proximate cause doctrine is to avoid imposing on
the defendant a crushing liability totally out of proportion to his
degree of fault."8 And so the rules of proximate cause are at least
partially "geared to fault and will reflect the policy of making the
extent of liability reflect the degree of fault or the factors which
made conduct blameworthy."7
This aspect of the proximate cause rules in accident law has long
been recognized' and was given explicit recognition in section 501(2)
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
The fact that the actor's misconduct is in reckless disregard
of another's safety rather than merely negligent is a matter
to be taken into account in determining whether a jury may
reasonably find that the actor's conduct bears a sufficient
"See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 52, § 42, at 249-50; Calabresi, supra note
51, at 72.
"Noting that "lp]roximate cause cannot be reduced to absolute rules," Prosser
quotes 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 110 (1906) as an accurate summary
of the role of proximate cause: "It is always to be determined on the facts of each case
upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy and precedent." See
W. PROSSER, supra note 52, § 42, at 249.
"See, e.g., 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 33, § 20.4, at 1132.

"Id at 1133.
"See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 57, at 589.
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causal relation to another's harm to make the actor liable
therefor.81
Rules of proximate cause, then, are to be "stretched" in cases of
reckless misconduct. The rationale is clear: the application of rules
designed to prevent liability from becoming unfairly disproportionate to the defendant's fault should adjust to situations in which
the defendant is in fact seriously at fault.
There is no good reason why this principle relaxing the normal
proximate cause rules should not apply to cases of flagrant
misbehavior of manufacturers marketing defective products. In fact,
there are at least two reasons why the principle is even better
suited to the products liability context than to other accident situations. First, although one reason sometimes given for the principle
is to deter similar misbehavior in the future,8" liability insurance
often frustrates this objective.' Yet, while liability for many kinds
of accidents is generally insured, manufacturers often self-insure
against products liability losses. Moreover, insurance premiums for
most insured manufacturers are "loss-rated" so that the price is
calculated primarily on the manufacturer's past products liability
loss experience." Second, a general criticism of the principle's deterrence rationale, that "most torts are unintentional or are committed
in disregard or ignorance of legal consequences,"8 is less applicable
to the present context than to the typical accident situation. While a
manufacturer's decision to market a product in flagrant disregard of
a danger to consumers is certainly not an intentional tort in the
same way as a punch in the nose, it is nevertheless deliberate and
planned. Accordingly, manufacturers at least have an opportunity to
consider the potential legal consequences flowing from their conduct. Indeed, while individual tortfeasors may not usually contemplate the legal consequences of their actions in most tort contexts;
manufacturers often do receive legal counsel prior to acting.
Thus, rules of proximate cause may fairly be stretched in cases of
flagrant marketing misconduct by manufacturers.
Most courts for example have held that the normal proximate
cause rules limiting liability to the foreseeable consequences of an
action operate in the products liability area as in tort law
generally." Liability should probably be barred, therefore, if the
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 501(2)
"See 2 HARPER & JAMES, suIra note 33, §

(1965).
20.6, at 1152-53.

"See id at 1133.
"See Owen, Punitive Damage8, supra note 9, at 1309 n.252 and accompanying
text.
"2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 33, § 20.6, at 1152 (footnote omitted).
"See generally 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 11.02 (1976).
However, liability in strict tort under the cost-benefit theory may arise without regard
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plaintiff is injured by slipping on the vomit of a person who has suffered an allergic reaction to the defendant's drug which carried inadequate warnings of such reactions."' However, if the drug
manufacturer knew of frequent cases of similar allergic reactions
but failed to warn about them to avoid losing sales, the scope of
liability flowing from such reactions could appropriately be broadened to include the plaintiffs injuries in the case hypothesized.
The relaxation of the normal proximate cause rules in cases of
reckless misconduct applies equally well in intervening cause cases.
Suppose the plaintiff is injured by the explosion of a cylinder overpressurized by his employer with compressed air. Suppose further
that, although the cylinder had contained a gas refrigerant when
purchased by the employer from defendant, and bore a label indicating that refilling the cylinder was not only dangerous but contrary to law, the employer had nevertheless recharged it with
pressurized air.8" If the seller of gas refrigerant had no reason to
know that its warning was being ignored and that cylinders were
being refilled in a dangerous manner, it should not be liable for failing to add a safety release valve to prevent overpressurization by
third parties acting contrary to law and to the warnings on the
cylinder. In this situation, the intervening action of the employer
should probably break the causal chain of events. But suppose the
seller knew that persons frequently were being injured severely by
explosions caused by such rechargings despite the warnings, and
that installation of a simple and inexpensive safety device on the
cylinders would eliminate the danger. Under these circumstances,
the failure to add such a device might well be sufficiently blameworthy to expand the scope of liability to include resulting injuries
regardless of the culpability of the employer's intervening conduct. 9
The rules of proximate cause thus may properly be stretched, and
to the foreseeability of the injuries, see text accompanying note 41, and a few courts
have so intimated. Cf. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 491-94, 525 P.2d
1033, 1037-39 (1974); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 219 Pa. 479, 485, 337 A.2d
893, 900 (1975); Helicoid Gage Div. of Amer. Chain & Cable Co. v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d
573, 575 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1974).
"7Cf. Crankshaw v. Piedmont Driving Club, Inc., 115 Ga. App. 820, 156 S.E.2d 208
(1967) (unwholesome food).
"Cf. Union Carbide Corp. v. Holton, 136 Ga. App. 726, 222 S.E.2d 105 (1975).
"It should be noted in this situation, as in many others raising the issue of proximate causation, that the normal rules of proximate cause may be sufficiently flexible
to expand the scope of liability to include injuries attributable to negligent or reckless
misconduct even without a special rule so providing. The flagrancy of a defendant's
misconduct often reflects, among other factors, his awareness of a particular danger.
See Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 9, at 1361-71. And dangers known are obviously "foreseeable" which is of course how the scope of responsibility is defined in
many proximate cause contexts.
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the scope of a manufacturer's duty accordingly increased, in products liability cases of reckless manufacturer misconduct.
V.

DEFENSES BASED ON PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT

Four different defense doctrines based on the plaintiff's conduct- contributory negligence, comparative negligence, assumption
of risk, and product misuse-may be available in a products liability
case, depending upon the jurisdiction and the plaintiffs theory of
liability. The aggravated blameworthiness of the manufacturer in
marketing a defective product may play a significant role with
respect to each of these defenses.
A.

Contributory Negligence

Of all the rules of liability and defense, the contributory
negligence defense is most clearly affected by the reckless nature of
a defendant's conduct: "A plaintiffs contributory negligence does
not bar recovery for harm caused by the defendant's reckless
disregard for the plaintiff's safety."" The rule logically applies to
products liability cases. 1 So, if a plaintiff is injured in a crash caused
by the blowout of a tire having an obvious defect that he carelessly
failed to discover, his negligent failure to inspect the tire will not
bar a negligence or warranty 2 action if the manufacturer is shown
to have marketed the tire in reckless disregard of consumer safety.
Moreover, even the plaintiff's negligent decision to drive on the tire
after discovering the defect and realizing the danger will not bar his
recovery on contributory negligence grounds." It is difficult to
argue against this rule since the responsibility for an injury caused
by a highly blameworthy defendant can much more fairly be
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 503(1) (1965). A duplication of the rule is
found in section 482(1) of the Restatement. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 52, §
65, at 426; 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 33, § 22.6, at 1213.
"1See Ussery v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., [1973-75 Transfer Binder] PROD. LIAB.
REP. (CCH) 7084, at 12,470, 12,479 n.4 (4th Cir. 1973) (Winter, C.J., dissenting) (opinion withdrawn by order filed March 31, 1975).
"In a minority of states, contributory negligence will defeat a warranty claim.
E.g., Coleman v. American Universal of Florida, Inc., 264 So. 2d 451 (Fla. App. 1972);
Devaney v. Sarno, 122 N.J. Super. 99, 299 A.2d 95, revd on other grounds, 125 N.J.
Super. 414, 311 A.2d 208 (1973) (failure to wear seatbelt). See generally 2 L. FRUMER &
M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16.01[3] (1976). Of course "simple" contributory
negligence is held not to be a defense to strict liability in tort in most states. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965).
"See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 503, Comment b (1965): "[H]e is not barred from recovery merely by a failure to exercise reasonable care . . . after he knows
of the defendant's reckless misconduct and realizes the danger."
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placed on him, the principal causative agent, than on the injured
plaintiff who was at worst somewhat careless concerning his own
safety. However, if the injured plaintiff was reckless with regard to
his own safety, as by driving at high speeds on a tire discovered to
be seriously defective, he will be barred from recovery against even
a reckless manufacturer whether the action is brought in
negligence,"" warranty, 5 or perhaps even strict liability in tort."
B.

Comparative Negligence

While the application of the comparative negligence doctrine to
products liability litigation involves too many complex and unresolved
problems to examine fully here, 7 a few observations may be made
on the effect a manufacturer's aggravated blameworthiness should
have on the doctrine in general. Abandoning the "all-or-nothing" approach of the contributory negligence defense, comparative
negligence instead apportions damages between the parties on the
basis of their respective fault. Consequently, if a manufacturer is
shown to have been flagrantly at fault, it initially would appear appropriate simply to balance this off against the plaintiffs contributory fault in apportioning damages.
Yet this conclusion conflicts with the traditional contributory
negligence rule discussed above that allows a negligent plaintiff full
recovery for injuries caused by a reckless defendant. How is this impasse to be resolved? One solution would be to attempt to advance
the punitive, deterrent, and compensatory purposes underlying the
full recovery rule to the utmost by requiring the reckless defendant
to pay for all the plaintiffs damages. But this full recovery approach
"See, e.g., 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 33, § 22.6, at 1214; W. PROSSER, supra
note 52, at 426; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 482(2), 503(3) (1965).
"Even in those states that do not recognize the contributory negligence defense
in warranty cases, see note 92 supra, a court might bar recovery on the basis of the
plaintiff's reckless disregard for his own safety. In a case involving this type of aggravated consumer misconduct, the court might find that the defect was not a proximate cause of the injury. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314, Comment 13, 2-316(3)(b) & Comment 8,
2-715(2)(b) & Comment 5.
"The conduct may amount to an unreasonable or reckless assumption of the risk
and an action may be barred on that account. See text accompanying notes 104-16 infra. Even in such a situation, however, a rule of comparative misconduct would probably best accommodate the interests of the parties in most cases. See text accompanying note 116 infra.
"7On the role of comparative negligence in strict tort cases, see Schwartz, Strict
Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REV. 171 (1974); Twerski, The Use
and Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Products Liability, 10 IND. L. REV. 797

(1977); Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 299, 319-335 (1977).
"See generally V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974).

1977

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

looks almost exclusively to the interests of the plaintiff," whereas
the comparative negligence doctrine generally has been adopted to
reach a fair accommodation of interests between plaintiffs and
defendants. Since contributorily negligent plaintiffs are to some extent both causally and morally responsible for their injuries, it
would appear fair to require them to absorb the relatively small proportion of their damages logically attributable more to their own
negligent misbehavior than to the defendant's reckless misconduct. 10
It may be that special considerations in some products liability
situations will dictate the reconsideration of the damages apportionment principle as Professor Twerski has suggested. '
Perhaps, indeed, the reckless manufacturer should be punished by
being required to pay for the damages otherwise more appropriately
allocated to the injured plaintiff. Yet punishment is probably more
satisfactorily administered through assessments of punitive
damages"0 2 than by relieving the injured party of his fair share of
the burden of the actual damages."' Thus, in the application of the
comparative negligence rules, the recklessness of a manufacturer's
misconduct ordinarily should affect only the apportionment of
damages.
C. Assumption of Risk
While it has been subjected to less abuse than has the contributory negligence defense, assumption of risk has been battered
around quite a bit by courts' and commentators,1 5 in tort law
"See id. at 108.
'"Moreover, the application of a rule of comparative fault would obviate, at least
for this purpose, the need to determine whether the defendant's conduct was
"flagrant" or "reckless."
"'Cf. Twerski, The Use and Abuse, supra note 97; Twerski, From Defect to
Cause, supra note 97.
" See generally Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 9.

"'Theoretically an award of punitive damages to the plaintiff could result in a
"wash" with the compensatory damages allocated against him for his proportionate
fault. The two amounts, however, would properly be identical only on rare occasions.
Nevertheless, in cases of marginally reckless misconduct by the defendant, this type of
wash approach-one that would fully compensate the plaintiff without substantially
punishing the defendant-might often appeal to the jury.
"E.g., Hale v. O'Neill, 492 P.2d 101 (Alaska 1971); Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So.2d
287 (Fla. 1977); Roseman v. City of Estherville, 199 N.W.2d 125 (Iowa 1972); Williamson
v. Smith, 83 N.M. 336, 491 P.2d 1147 (1971); Farley v. MM Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751
(Tex. 1975); Rosas v. Buddies Food Stores, 518 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1975).
"'See, e.g., 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 33, § 21.8; James, Assumption of Risk
Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185 (1968); James, Assumption of Risk 61 YALE
L.J. 141 (1952). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 893, at 70-87 (Tent.

Draft No. 9, 1963).
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generally and products liability law in particular. ' Traditionally,
however, and still in the vast majority of states in most situations, a
plaintiff's knowing and voluntary assumption of the risk is a complete bar to his recovery, even when the defendant has acted
recklessly: "A plaintiff who voluntarily assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of the defendant cannot
recover for such harm." 107 In some situations more than others, it is
particularly harsh to bar a plaintiff from all recovery because of his
reasonable decision to encounter a risk created by the defendant's
misconduct. As a result, some courts and legislatures have abolished
the rule either altogether"8 or in situations in which one party occupies a powerful position of control over the welfare of the plaintiff. 109
Manufacturers, with near-monopolistic control over vital information concerning product hazards and danger control, have such a
grip on the welfare of consumers.1 Partly as a response to this
phenomenon, most courts have narrowed the availability of the
assumption of risk defense in strict tort products liability actions by
limiting the defense to cases of negligent assumptions of risk: "If
the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the
danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the
product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.'' 1 '
This limitation on the assumption of risk defense may or may
not adequately accommodate the interests of producers and consumers in a typical products liability case 2 involving innocent or
perhaps even negligent misconduct by the manufacturer. But the
'"Two excellent articles on the topic are Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products.
Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REV. 122 (1961); Twerski, Old Wine in a New
Flask-RestructuringAssumption of Risk in the Products Liability Era, 60 IOWA L.
REV. 1 (1974).
'"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965). Section 503(4) mirrors the rule
except that it is limited to the defendant's reckless misconduct.
'"See, e.g., cases cited in note 104 supra.
'"As, for example, employers and landlords. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 496A, Comment e (1965).
"'See Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 9, at 1258, 1272 n.69, 1365 n.507. Cf.
Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 371 A.2d 170 (N.H. 1977) (Kenison, C.J.).
"'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Messick v. General Motors Corp., 460 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1972) (making an
Erie guess on Texas law); Devaney v. Sarno, 125 N.J. Super. 414, 311 A.2d 208 (App.
Div. 1973), affd 65 N.J. 235, 323 A.2d 449 (1974); Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 274 Or.
403, 547 P.2d 132 (1976). But see Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tex.
1974) (repudiating Fifth Circuit's Erie guess, holding that the plaintiffs unreasonableness in encountering the risk is not always an element of the assumption of risk
defense in strict tort).
" The appropriateness of the rule will of course vary depending on the particular
situation. See generally Twerski, supra note 106.
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rule is quite clearly ill-suited to cases in which the risk assumed by
the plaintiff was created by the manufacturer in flagrant disregard
of the danger to consumers. Even in the general tort situation, it
has been seen that conduct strikingly similar to negligent assumption of risk will not bar a plaintiff's recovery against a reckless
defendant. As discussed above, the plaintiff who is injured when he
unreasonably continues to drive on a tire discovered to be defective
may not, on contributory negligence grounds, be barred from
recovery against the manufacturer who marketed the product in
reckless disregard of the risk to consumers." 3 Because of the
manufacturer's powerful position of control over product safety, this
is surely the proper result, whatever may be the plaintiffs theory of
recovery and whatever the name of the asserted defense.
Is the answer then to abolish all forms of assumption of risk in
products liability cases in which the plaintiff's injury is attributable
to some reckless misconduct by the manufacturer? While such a
solution does have some merit, it also has some drawbacks. Punishment and deterrence, as has been discussed,"' are probably better
accomplished in other ways, and even the reckless manufacturer has
a legitimate interest in avoiding liability for at least some injuries
attributable to the knowing misuse of its products. If an all-ornothing assumption of risk rule of some sort is to be retained in
these cases, it should probably be limited to cases in which the consumer recklessly assumes the risk of injury. " ' In the defective tire
hypothetical, for example, perhaps the plaintiff should be barred
from recovery if he drove at high speeds on the tire he knew to be
seriously defective.
Cases such as this have a strong flavor of superseding causation,
and it may be appropriate in some such instances to shield even the
reckless manufacturer from liability altogether. Yet clearly the more
palatable approach would be to apportion the damages in such cases
according to the respective fault of the two reckless parties according to the rules of comparative negligence. " Assumption of risk
could thereby be abolished as a complete defense at least to
flagrantly blameworthy misconduct by manufacturers. At a
minimum, however, a court in such cases would do well to limit the
defense to instances of reckless assumption of risk, as discussed
above.
"aSee note 93 supra and accompanying text.

"'See text accompanying notes 102-03 8upra.
"'Cf. Worth v. Dunn, 98 Conn. 51, 61, 118 A. 467, 471 (1922) ("reckless and unnecessary exposure to risk of injury").
"See generally Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1977) (merging assumption
of risk into comparative fault); V. SCHWARTZ. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 111, 165-75
(1964).
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D. Product Misuse

The "misuse" or abnormal use of a product will serve under
some circumstances to defeat an action by a person injured by a product claimed to have been defective. While some courts treat abnormal use as an affirmative defense,1 ' and other courts consider normal use as part of the plaintiffs prima facie case,'18 most courts
agree that product misuse will bar recovery in some situations.' 9 So,
a person injured in an automobile crash caused by tire failure may
be barred from recovery if the failure is partially attributable to
substantial overinflation of the tire contrary to the manufacturer's
instructions. 2 ' Misuse is a bar to recovery in cases like this because
"the result is not within the risk, or, as many courts state the matter, the result is not proximately caused by the defendant's conduct.""' Since the rationale for this "defense" is thus usually based
upon proximate causation, the predominant "test" or definition of
the rule that has evolved is one of foreseeability: "[T]he manufacturer is not liable for injuries resulting from abnormal or unintended use of his product, if such use was not reasonably foreseeable.""'
Earlier it was determined that the normal rules of proximate
cause should be "stretched" in cases of flagrant marketing
misbehavior."' Since the misuse "defense" is generally only a special
application of the proximate cause doctrine, it seems clear that it
should be affected in a similar manner by similar manufacturer
misbehavior. Thus, in the overinflated tire case, suppose the
manufacturer knew that overinflation would weaken its tires, that
consumers were frequently overinflating them in an effort to prolong the life of the tread, and that tire failures causing serious injuries often occurred as a result. The failure to take effective steps
to warn of the danger of overinflation under these circumstances
might reasonably be considered reckless misconduct," ' and the scope
of responsibility could then appropriately be expanded to include
'E.g., McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co., 391 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1968); Perfection Paint
& Color Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 106, 258 N.E.2d 681 (1970).
..'E.g., Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 171 N.W.2d 201 (1969). Cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comments g, h (1965).
"'See generally 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 15 (1976);
Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption
of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 95-105 (1972).
"Cf. Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 288-89 (5th Cir. 1975);
McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co., 391 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1968).
"'Noel, supra note 119, at 95.
nl L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 15, at 404 (1976) (emphasis
in original).
"'See text accompanying notes 76-89 supra.
"'See generally Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 9, at 1345-52.
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many injuries resulting from this type of misuse. Normally a tire
manufacturer might "reasonably" foresee overinflation of a limited
amount, perhaps up to six or eight pounds or so. It would appear
both fair and logical to expand the "reasonable foreseeability" of a
highly blameworthy tire manufacturer to include instances of much
greater overinflation, such as ten or twelve pounds over the recommended pressure, or perhaps even more. 2 '
The rationale, of course, for "stretching" the reasonable
foreseeability test of the product misuse defense in cases of reckless
manufacturer misconduct is naturally similar to the justification for
expanding the rules of proximate cause in similar circumstances. In
both instances the rules at least in part seek to protect defendants
from liability burdens greatly disproportionate to their actual fault.
Thus, if a manufacturer is shown to have actually been at fault, and
flagrantly so, the misuse defense should be adapted to reflect this
fact. Perhaps the use of a comparative fault or causation rule might
be the fairest and least confusing way to accomplish this result in
some misuse cases. 2 " Apart from this approach, however, the
"reasonably foreseeable" test of the misuse defense should generally
be "stretched" in products liability cases involving flagrant manufacturer misbehavior.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Manufacturers who market defective products that injure consumers are required under strict products liability principles to pay
for the resulting injuries without regard to their blame in marketing
such products. Occasionally a manufacturer's conduct in placing or
leaving a product on the market in a particular condition is for one
reason or another highly blameworthy. In cases of this type, the
traditional structure of the normal accident rules of liability and
defense is thrown off balance. Much, perhaps most, products liability
doctrine developed under the law of negligence, where the manufacturer's carelessness- often merely inadvertent-was a focal point
'"Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962), a negligence action for
the death of an infant who ingested the defendant's furniture polish that bore inade-

quate warnings, was one of the first cases to replace the "intended use" defense with a
test of reasonable foreseeability. " 'Intended use' is but a convenient adaptation of the
basic test of 'reasonable foreseeability' framed to more specifically fit the factual situa... Id at 83. It is
tions out of which arise questions of a manufacturer's liability.
noteworthy that the manufacturer in this case had failed to warn adequately of the
toxic nature of the polish despite its knowledge of thirty-two cases of human ingestion
resulting in ten deaths. Id at 88.
'"See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). Cf. text ac.ompanying note 116 and note 96 supra.
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from which the rules of duty, causation, and defense were
generated. With the advent of strict liability in tort, readjustments
have been made in some of the products liability rules, particularly
in connection with the traditional defenses of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk. But something was apparently
lost sight of in the dust of the stampede first to demolish the bastion of privity and then to erect a new bastion for strict liability in
tort. So much attention was devoted to the questions of whether and
how innocent manufacturers should be liable for defects in their products, surely the more usual situation, that the questions of whether
and how the rules should apply to highly blameworthy manufacturers were simply forgotten.
The purpose of this article has been to propose some readjustments that should help to restore a fair balance in the rules of
liability and defense in cases of flagrant marketing misbehavior.
Since the courts so far have failed to address the problem, the
analysis has necessarily proceeded largely in the dark. Surely
judicial experience in applying the proposed changes in the rules
will be necessary to determine their usefulness in resolving products liability cases. Some of the adjustments I have advanced merely involve the application of established rules of tort law to the products liability context; others tread on less traditional ground. But
each of the changes proposed is designed to strike a fair accommodation between the interests of manuacturers and those of consumers.
The scope of this article has been limited to the central issues in
products liability litigation- defectiveness, causation, and the
defenses based on the plaintiffs conduct. Several of the more
peripheral issues, however, are ripe for exploration. The rule obtaining in many states, for example, prohibiting recoveries for wrongful
death in warranty actions will probably not survive a reasoned
scrutiny in the context of a highly blameworthy manufacturer.1" It
may also be that a products liability suit should lie against an
employer, despite the normal bar to such suits in the workmen's
'"Recovery under the wrongful death acts, patterned after Lord Campbell's Act,
usually is limited to deaths caused by "a wrongful act, neglect or default," or similar
language. See, e.g., D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 553 n.13 (1973).
Some courts prohibit recovery for wrongful death in warranty actions on the theory
that warranty liability is contractual and "strict" rather than the tortious type of
wrongful behavior contemplated by the death acts, See, e.g., Nectas v. General Motors
Corp., 357 Mass. 546, 259 N.E.2d 234 (1970). See generally 3 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 42, at 651 (1976). However, proof that a defendant acted
recklessly should logically permit recovery even under a narrow construction of such
an act, for reckless conduct is surely classifiable as "wrongful" or "neglectful." Nor
should the fact that the underlying theory of recovery requires less proof of blameworthiness affect this conclusion. Cf. Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 9, at 1268-75.
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compensation laws, for removing an appropriate manufacturerinstalled guard on a piece of industrial machinery in order to increase production.' ' And many other products liability rules, involvl'Such action by the employer is highly blameworthy when done to increase production if the guard is appropriate for the task to which the machine is put by the
employer. If the employee in such a case were to sue the manufacturer for defective
design, the manufacturer would prevail in many instances on grounds of the nondefectiveness of the machinery, or on principles of intervening causation. See, e.g., Ward v.
Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1971); Smith v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 302 F.2d 570
(3d Cir. 1962); Santiago v. Package Mach. Co., 123 Ill. App. 2d 305, 260 N.E.2d 89
(1970). See generally Mitchell, Products Liability, Workmen's Compensation and the
Industrial Accident, 14 DuQ. L. REV. 349, 369-73 (1976).
Because workmen's compensation benefits are normally provided by statute to be
the employee's exclusive remedy for covered injuries against the employer, 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 65.00 (1976), an employee in such a case
would be left with only his workmen's compensation benefits which are plainly inadequate and do not even purport to provide full reparation. See THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 126 (1976); Mitchell,
supra, at 354-56. There are two exceptions to the exclusive remedy doctrine that may
logically combine, however, to permit an employee to maintain a products liability action against the employer whose removal of the manufacturer's guard caused the
employee to be injured: (1) an exception based on the employer's intentional injury to
his employee, and (2) an exception for cases in which the employer is acting in a "dual
capacity."
Considered alone, the intentional injury exception has been construed narrowly to
exclude an employer's removal of guards. See Rosales v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 41
Ill. App. 3d 787, 354 N.E.2d 553 (1976); Santiago v. Brill Monfort Co., 11 App. Div. 2d
1041, 205 N.Y.S.2d 919, affd, 10 N.Y.2d 718, 176 N.E.2d 835, 219 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1960).
See generally 2A A. LARSON, supra, at § 68; Schmidt & German, Employer Misconduct
as Affecting the Exclusiveness of Workmen's Compensation, 18 U. PITT. L. REV. 81
(1956). The employee's argument that the exclusive remedy provision of the statute
should be interpreted to allow suits in this type of case is of course weakened if the
statute provides for an increase in benefits for employer misconduct. See 2A A. LARSON.
supra, at §§ 69.10-.20 (1975).
The second applicable exception to the exclusive remedy principle, the "dualcapacity" doctrine, allows the employer to be sued if the injury is traceable to an activity of the employer "that confers on him obligations independent of those imposed
on him as employer." 2A A. LARSON, supra, at § 72.80, at 14-112 (1976). A recent case
has rejected the argument that an employer removing a guard to increase production
is thereby acting in a "second capacity" as a manufacturer of the machinery
reconstructed to serve his needs. Rosales v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 41 Ill. App. 3d
at 792, 354 N.E.2d at 557. See also Kottis v. United States Steel Corp., 543 F.2d 22
(7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3600 (Mar. 8, 1977); Williams v. State Corp. Ins.
Fund, 50 Cal. App. 3d 116, 123 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1975); Needham v. Fred's Frozen
Foods, Inc., 359 N.E.2d 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977); Neal v. Roura Iron Works, Inc., 66
Mich. App. 273, 238 N.W.2d 837 (1975); Panagos v. North Detroit Gen. Hosp., 35 Mich.
App. 554, 192 N.W.2d 542 (1971). See generally Comment, Workmen's Compensation
and Employer Suability: The Dual Capacity Doctrine, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 818 (1974).
As argued cogently in the Rosales dissent, however, the two exceptions merge into a compelling argument for permitting suit against an employer who reconstructs his
machinery by removing guards to increase production at the obvious expense of
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ing problems of privity, obvious, dangers, disclaimers of liability,"8
limitations on remedies; notice, statutes of limitations, contribution

and indemnity and others, may also prove to require readjustment
in cases of flagrant marketing misbehavior. The time is nigh for the
courts to re-examine the normal rules of liability and defense in the
context of the highly blameworthy manufacturer.

employee safety. See 41 Ill. App. 3d at 796, 354 N.E.2d at 561 (Simon, J., dissenting).
By so altering the machinery, in flagrant disregard of the danger to employees, the
employer flouts and subverts the common-law and statutory rules of product safety.
Apart from the fact that such behavior deserves to be punished and ought to be
deterred, an employee injured thereby surely should be afforded full compensation
against the responsible party. Allowing noninsurable damage suits against the
employer appears to be an effective method of accomplishing these objectives without
substantially impairing the general exclusive remedy principle of the workmen's compensation laws. Moreover, punitive damages assessments might even be in order in appropriate cases of this type.
'"It should be noted that an early exception to the privity defense was made for
cases involving the sale by the manufacturer of "an article which he knows to be imminently dangerous to life or limb of another without notice of its qualities." Huset v.
J.I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 F. 865, 871 (8th Cir. 1903). See Kuelling v.
Roderick Lean Mfg. Co., 183 N.Y. 78, 75 N.E. 1098 (1905) (fraudulent act); Langridge v.
Levy, 2 M. & W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (1837), aff'd, 4 M. & W. 337 (1838) (fraud).
There appears to be no particular reason why this privity exception should not be
extended to other nonfraudulent cases of flagrant manufacturer misbehavior as well.
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (1965) ("A plaintiff who by
contract or otherwise expressly agrees to accept a risk of harm arising from the defendant's negligent or reckless conduct cannot recover for such harm, unless the agreement is contrary to public policy.") with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 337(1)
(Tent. Draft No. 12, 1977) ("A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused intentionally or recklessly is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.")

